While the impact of the Troubles retains centrality within much of Northern Irish political life, the spectre of almost daily violence is becoming a more distant memory. Peace has come to the region. In spite of this, however, there are those who wish to maintain the utility of violence to achieve their stated aims. Most dominant amongst these are the violent dissident republican groups. No longer is their existence solely defined by their desire to bring about a united Ireland.
Introduction
The coming period should…see a new stage in the national independence struggle, one in which the lessons of the past will have been studied and learned and which will carry the independence struggle to a successful conclusion by establishing in Ireland By acting as spoilers they are attempting to dismantle the politicised peace, which is now seen throughout Northern Ireland. They are attempting to do this through their murders, and attempted murders, of Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and prison officers, attacks on the security services, bombings of commercial properties, and the ever-present punishment attacks and vigilante murders within the nationalist and republican neighbourhoods of Northern Ireland.
They are united in their division, from Sinn Féin and the peace process. However, they are divided in this unity. The sustained fragmentation of the dissident community, both violent and non-violent, has meant that they have seen themselves to be in competition with each other. This is a competition for legitimisation, to be the "true" and most competent voice within the dissident community. This has seen the groups attempt to outbid one another, in order to show that they are the ones who will be able to achieve a united Ireland through paramilitary force. This is a competition for both membership and support, being fought within dissident republicanism but also against Sinn Féin.
The paucity of VDR actors, the continued fragmentation, and resultant internal competition for support has traditionally led to significantly weakened organisations. These groups have been weak across a range of fronts, most notably support, membership, paramilitary capabilities, financing and legitimacy. These weaknesses have unsurprisingly resulted in an inability to successfully spoil the peace process, or mount a significant challenge to the republican prominence of Sinn Féin. In reaction to this in 2012 it was announced that RIRA, Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and other disparate and previously unaligned dissidents had merged to form a new group, under the all-encompassing title of "The IRA", 9 otherwise known as the New IRA (hereafter IRA/New IRA). By merging they were attempting to provide a The present article aims to assess how learning has helped shape the strategies, tactics and the ultimate legitimisation of the VDR groups wishing to maintain the armed struggle. It does so by amalgamating the data and analysis from three separate on-going projects. The first of these analyses splits in paramilitary and political republicanism from 1916 to the present day. Within this research 43 leadership and rank and file members of the Irish Republican Movement, both dissident and mainstream, were interviewed to assess their understanding of why and how the splits took place, as well as detailing their own personal choices during these processes. Their interviews were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). 10 The second research project relates to a database of VDR activity and personnel. This database was developed and maintained using exclusively open source data, and displays the demographic details of those who have been convicted and charged of VDR activity from 1994 to the present day. It also hosts event specific information, in relation to VDR activity across the same period.
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Both of these are complimented by the final project, that relates to the collection and analysis of VDR statements from 2007 to the present day. These statements are analysed using grounded theory. 12 Each of these projects are analysed to assess the role which learning has played for the ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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6 modern-day VDR groups. By pooling the findings from each of these three projects, it allows for the assessment of learning in relation to tactics, strategies and organisational evolution. 13 The majority of this article focuses on the process of internal learning within Irish republicanism.
However, prior to this analysis there is firstly an introduction to the broader republican history of both external and internal learning
External Learning
Throughout the history of Irish republicanism learning has played a significant role, in the evolution of the movement. This relates to the simultaneous political and paramilitary campaigns. Groups have learned from internal experiences, as well as the history of the movement, as is clearly illustrated in with the publication of The Lessons of History. 14 This internal learning has repeatedly been supplemented, through the external learning from international political and paramilitary revolutionaries. It is repeatedly referenced that the French Revolution, which was coming to a close, heavily influenced the 1798 Rebellion, led by Theobald Wolfe Tone. 15 This tradition of learning from, and being inspired by, external groups has continued across each generation of Irish Republican groups since. This is most apparent during the Troubles. The need for expanding tactical expertise led the Provisional IRA, and other republican groups, to seek direct training from international allies to compliment their own internal training. This saw the PIRA receive training, as well as weapons and explosives, from Libya. 16 In the 1970s it is also widely believed that both the Irish National Liberation Army 
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"Number one the Provos 27 had learned from the mistakes the Stickies 28 had made and they didn"t put forward the three parliaments they put forward the one, number two they insisted that they were keeping the war going, and that was regarded by many people, including the lady I was speaking to this week as the engine of the whole thing." In his interview Kerr made particular reference to the advanced capabilities of the VDR groups" explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), which had been used to target PSNI officers. It was noted that these EFPs were "far more effective" that the PIRA equivalent, the projected recoilless improvised grenade (PRIG). The development of these and other weapons are being used not just for devastation. They are also propaganda and recruitment tools. By demonstrating the advancement in not just their weaponry, but they weapons-making techniques, the dissidents are saying to potential and existing members that they have the capability to launch a significant armed campaign. They are saying that they can be trusted, to bring the fight to the security forces in Northern Ireland. They are both willing and able to reignite the armed campaign against the British presence in Ireland.
As much was stated in the claim of responsibility after the November 2014 attack.
"Volunteers from our Belfast Brigade fired a homemade rocket launcher striking an armoured PSNI military vehicle. Despite being heavily armed the PSNI fled the scene. The IRA will continue to increase its military attacks on state forces. Our capacity to target state forces is increasing and developing. As a result we will continue to target them at a time of our choosing." 
Copying to be Dissident
While there are many lessons being learned from international conflicts, the majority of the dissidents" strategic and tactical decisions have developed through their analysis of their own history. The lessons of their Provisional past are being applied to their dissident present. Some of these internal lessons, tactical, strategic and organisational, will be analysed here. Throughout the assessment it is important to question what the groups are attempting to achieve at each stage. The VDR groups are not just carrying out attacks in order to achieve maximum destruction, or to bring them closer to a united Ireland. As was intimated above, the groups are constantly aiming to legitimise their independent existence from mainstream republicanism.
They are aiming to demonstrate that their campaign is worth supporting and joining. In order to do this groups have had to differentiate themselves, from both the Provisionals and their dissident rivals. They need to show how their approach, in seeking a united Ireland, will be different to their ideological rivals. This was emphasised by a leading member of the RIRA, describing the aspirations of the leadership at the birth of the group in the late 1990s.
"We urged members that they must kill a British soldier face to face, no sniper, with a gun as the Provos hadn"t done that in years and this would prove that they were different." 36 In the aftermath of a split, the new dissident organisation must differentiate themselves from the parent group they are moving away from. It is only when they achieve this that they can justify their independent existence. This is exactly what is being proposed in the above quote. The leadership acknowledged that they needed to differentiate themselves from the Provisionals, from whom they were splitting. This differentiation was not to create a whole new way of waging a terrorist war against "British occupation" of Northern Ireland. Their aim was to reach ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 15 into the past, to a time when they believed that the paramilitary republican campaign was more effective and popular than it was at the end of the twentieth century. They were copying to be different. Different from the politicised Provisionals, and different from their dissident rivals.
The origins of the RIRA did not see the group kill a British solider "face to face." The organisation was almost decimated in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing of 1998. This attack on the nationalist market town was the most lethal attack of the entirety of the Troubles. A total of twenty-nine people were killed, and more than two hundred were injured. In the aftermath the leadership of the new organisation were arrested, and many others disengaged as a result of counter-terrorist crackdown on VDR actors. But many also left due to their disillusionment with the trajectory of the new group. 37 The early twenty-first century was a time of sporadic activity for the group. Their campaign of dissident violence was never able to take hold, and resultantly they deemed it necessary to restructure and reassess the strategy of the organisation. 38 When they decided to re-launch their campaign in 2007, they once again aimed to prove that they were different. In 2009 they did just that. They did something that the "Provos" had not done in years.
They killed two British soldiers, face to face in the Massereene Barracks attacks. Through this attack they were saying to their enemies, but also their membership and support, that they were to be taken seriously. They were capable and willing, to once again take the "war" directly to the British security establishment. By carrying out this attack they were no longer only suggesting that they were different from the Provisionals. They were also now demonstrating that this new incarnation of the RIRA was different from the original organisation. In doing so they were once again trying to attract the support of those republicans, who had either left the organisation, or whose support and faith in the political solution of the Provisionals was dwindling. They were ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 16 now saying that they were not only doing things differently from Sinn Féin, but that they were different from their former selves. They had learned from the mistakes and failings of their past.
Localised Learning
Upon assessment of the tactical choices of the VDR groups the re-emergence of some significant forms of attack, which have not been utilised since the Troubles, are apparent. Two of the most striking of these are the proxy and letter/parcel bombing campaigns of recent years. The proxy bomb was also utilised in a short-lived PIRA campaign, of the early 1990s. This involved paramilitaries forcing non-members to drive to army checkpoints, and other PIRA targets, with bombs in their cars. Often times this was taking place, while their family members were being held hostage. Upon reaching the target destination, the bombs were remotely detonated by members of the PIRA. The most regular victim of these bombings was not the security services targeted, but the "human bombs," who were often times tied into the vehicle. The selection of these people, all from the Catholic nationalist communities, was justified as they were accused by the paramilitaries as being collaborators with the security forces. The Provisionals brought this brutal form of violence to an end, after the Catholic Church and the wider nationalist community put them under significant pressure.
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This ruthless tactic has seen a re-emergence in recent years. Between 2010 and 2015 there were seven high profile cases of attempted proxy bombings, carried out by VDR groups. None of these resulted in fatalities, for either the proxy bombers or the target they were ordered to drive to. However, it does demonstrate the intent of the groups to utilise this method to attack their intended victims. This tactic has been most widely used by the IRA/New IRA. Unlike the
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Provisionals of the 1990s, the dissidents are not justifying the selection of proxies by accusing them of being collaborators or informers. The people they are forcing to carry the bombs are citizens, working within the republican areas of Northern Ireland. They are bus, van and taxi drivers whose vehicles have been ambushed by the paramilitaries. This suggests that the proxies themselves do not represent a symbolic target. They are being used merely as a tool of the attack.
By using them as a transporter, this allows the terrorists to be distant from the location of attack.
This in turn lessens the risk of arrest.
What is most significant about the resurgence of the proxy bomb is the location and target of the violence. Of the seven attempted attacks that have taken place since 2010, four targeted the Strand Road PSNI station in Derry city, one of the most consistently attacked targets of VDR groups, through a variety of methods. 40 This suggests the localisation of tactics, targets and learning. It appears that the decision was made for this form of attack to be used against this particular station. It does not suggest a nationalised adoption of the tactic. This indicates that when we are assessing the activity of a terrorist organisation, that we must not only analyse the national and international activities. We can achieve a more significant insight, by analysing the 
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Nationalised Learning
Parallel to the localised proxy bombings, there has been a nationalised parcel and letter bombing campaign by the IRA/New IRA. The VDR data demonstrates that between 2012 and August 2015 there have been nineteen individual letter and parcel bomb attacks. This includes both detonated and undetonated devices. As is displayed in Table 1 46 In their claim of responsibility the PIRA stated that the letter bombs were intended for "members of the establishment." 47 The purpose of the campaign was to highlight the prisoners" protests for political status in the Maze prison, 48 protests which would in turn lead to two separate mass hunger strikes by the prisoners the second of which saw ten participants pass away.
The parallels between the PIRA letter bombing campaign of the 1970s, and the modern-day campaign of the IRA/New IRA are clear. Once again the dissidents are reaching into the annals of history, and are copying a tactic used by their Provisional predecessors. The aim of this tactic is not just to cause harm to the intended victims, or create fear in a wider audience. As any definition stipulates an act of terrorism, such as this, through its choices of targets and methods is designed to also send out a specific message. 49 The targeting of prison officers is specifically designed to highlight what the dissidents classify as the on-going "prisoners struggle." In doing so they are attempting to draw parallels to the historic prisoner campaigns of the 1970s and 80s.
The utilisation of this tactic, in conjunction with statements and protests, is the dissidents" expression of their belief that the peace process and Provisional politicisation has failed. For them they are trying to portray that the justification of conflict of the Troubles is still present today. By returning to the tactics of the past they aim to illustrate the continuity of their grievances. This is an attempt to demonstrate their belief that the Provisionals have abandoned the republican struggle, and that they, the dissidents, are now obliged to carry it on.
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The Prisoners' Voice When terrorist learning is analysed it is important that the analysis does not just focus on the violence. 50 Assessing learning in relation to violence alone portrays only part of the process. One of the tools of this prisoner-focused strategy has been the strengthening of the prisoners"
voice. This is especially apparent subsequent to the 2012 merger. In the aftermath of this unification the dominant voice, speaking on behalf of the IRA/New IRA, has been that of the organisation"s imprisoned community. There have been frequent prisoner statements released, primarily by the Republican Prisoners in Roe 4 of Maghaberry prison. 52 The principal aim of these statements has been to highlight perceived injustices taking place within the prisons.
However, intermittently the statements also comment on key issues relating to dissident republicanism outside of the prison walls. political campaigns, while also examining the role of localised vigilantism. 57 The reverence in which the prisoner"s are held within Irish republicanism allows for them to raise issues, considered too divisive by others.
In the final two issues of Scairt Amach in 2015, the anonymous authors call into question the sustainability of one of the most controversial paramilitary republican tactics of all, punishment beatings and wider violent vigilantism. This is a tactic, which has been sustained across the eras of paramilitary republicanism. The VDR groups have been no different. They have continued to target those believed to be, or at least portrayed as, criminals and anti-social elements within the republican communities. Each generation of paramilitary has stated that punishment attacks are carried out to protect the republican communities, from drug dealing and general crime and antisocial disorder. They portray themselves as doing the job that the police cannot and will not do.
In turn they paint themselves as being the true community protectors. This is a tactic and message designed to strengthen their support, while simultaneously gaining power and control. 58 It is difficult to accurately measure the true rate of punishment attacks. However, in 2014 it was estimated that at least two were taking place in Northern Ireland each week. 59 These attacks have "We agree that punishments are a brutal measure that will naturally desensitise a victim.
We know that many victims of punishment attacks continue their criminal activities after a punishment has been meted out to them and we understand that when a Republican organisation has attacked an individual, that individual"s loved ones are liable to become hostile to the Republican cause. There must be an alternative created to this cycle but that alternative will not be delivered by British Police on Irish soil; this same British police force is inextricably linked to the very root causes of conflict in this Nation." only at its opening stages. It must therefore be watched more closely, to assess both its evolution and influence. The publishing of these articles and statements will not bring an end to punishment attacks. This would necessitate a wider organisational, and localised cell, debate.
This debate requires a trusted, and influential, voice to be the instigator. The prisoner voice may once again prove to meet the criteria.
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Dissident Introspection
It is clear that across numerous strategic, tactic and organisational aspects that the dissidents have learned from the Provisionals. They have utilised these lessons to differentiate their armed campaign, from the political strategy of Sinn Féin. By adopting the approaches of the past the groups are emphasising their distinctiveness in the republican quest for an independent Ireland.
But, their internal learning does not stop with their assessment of the Provisionals. There has also been a significant amount of introspection of the dissident modus operandi.
"We will learn from past mistakes and will strive to expand the theatre of our operations in line with our strategy." 62 This has already been addressed in relation to the on-going debate about punishment attacks.
However, the topic of introspection that has engulfed dissident republicanism in the recent past has been in relation to organisational fragmentation. It has been acknowledged across the groups, that the plethora of competing factions has significantly debilitated each group"s quest for legitimisation and support. "We call on all republicans to realign ourselves around the securing of achievable aims.
We have set forth a programme to rebuild the republican movement through political advancement. We have proposed that commemorating 1916 should be the annual barometer by which we measure our success especially in the run up to its centenary in 2016. Irish republicanism must be in a position on the occasion of this centenary to tell the Irish people that concrete political gains have been made toward making national reunification an unstoppable reality. The Proclamation is too important a document to condemn it to perpetual aspiration." 64 "2011 must be a year of introspection and innovation. We must look at ourselves and address our failings. What went before has reached its zenith. We need to explore and devise new ways of getting our message across. We need to be more innovative in our protests. We can no longer be satisfied that our protests simply happen: they must also have meaningful effect." "No matter what they do they"re not Republicans, they"re only criminals and that"s what happened. They went further down that criminal road and there is no way that they will ever be affiliated with us or use our name."
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The breakaway group in turn accused the parent organisation of being controlled by an elite unwilling to expand the organisation. 
Conclusion
The case of the VDR groups demonstrates to us the heterogeneity of terrorist learning. Some form of learning has significantly affected every aspect of the groups" existence. This learning has come from both internal and external sources. It has related to both the violent, and nonviolent activities of the groups. The modern day dissidents are utilising violent tactics and strategies, which have been both adopted and adapted from their republican past. This has been supplemented, and modernised, by learning from the advances in paramilitary weaponry from
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28 the Middle East and elsewhere. 71 By combining these internal and external lessons, the groups are attempting to portray that there is still a legitimate need for an armed struggle and that they have the competency to make it a success. By adopting these strategies and tactics, they are 
